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Abstract 
 
This chapter explores the concept of informality by analysing the organisation of 
Hamas’ mode of conduct, in relation to tunnel trade between the Gaza Strip and the 
Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. The chapter is divided into three analytical parts, which 
discuss respectively Hamas as a legitimate government and development actor; the 
relationship between illicit, illegal and informal; and whether Hamas’ management of 
the tunnel trade can be characterised as a formalisation process or a normalisation 
process. The analysis reveals that the concept of informality contains a conceptual 
elasticity, which entails a fluidity in the definition of what is formal/informal, 
licit/illicit, and legal/illegal in the case of tunnel trade in Gaza. This fluidity is 
directly transmissible to the normalisation/formalisation continuum, and 
consequently Hamas’ management contains elements of both normalising and 
formalising nature. Whether Hamas can be viewed as a formal or informal state- and 
development actor, depends on the perspective of the observer. 
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Introduction 
 
Informality can be examined from different angles in different contexts. This chapter 
investigates the concept of informality through the case of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 
Tunnel trade, conducted by Hamas, between Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, 
will serve as the empirical field of research. Furthermore, it will act as the prism, 
through which we shed light on a broad conceptual understanding of informality. 
Throughout the chapter, a hybrid understanding of Hamas, and their social as well as 
economic development activities, will be presented to explore the conceptual 
complexity of informality. 
The case of Hamas, and how they implement development in Gaza, is 
inevitable connected to the conflict between Palestine and Israel. Due to the conflict, 
and the armed battle against the Israeli siege, Hamas has been able to gain public 
authority and exercise power in Gaza (Hamas Covenant 1988). Nicholas Pelham 
states that, because of the siege, Hamas turned their focus towards the tunnels as a 
way of accessing food, water and electricity and the tunnels became “the lungs 
through which Gaza breathes” (Pelham 2012: 9). 
The complexity of the theoretical approaches and understandings of 
informality are wide. This chapter will build on the complexity and explore it further 
in relation to how the illegal and illicit are at play in the flexibility and fluidity of 
informality. The theoretical perspective presented by Van Schendel and Abraham 
(2005) will assist us in this endeavour via their advocacy for a radical change in 
understanding illegal transnational flows. These flows should be seen as social 
practices that reflect rules that are either legal or normative and upheld by states or 
produced socially (ibid: 15). 
The Hamas regulated tunnel trade can either be seen as illegal and illicit or 
legal and licit. The trade is hereby contesting the black and white understanding and is 
challenging the conceptualisation of legality and illegality, a notion that will be 
further explored in the following sections. 
On the basis of the conduction of the tunnel trade in Gaza, and Hamas as an 
actor in development, we seek to answer this research question:  
 
	 4	
“Based on the case of tunnel trade, how does Hamas’ role as an actor in Gaza 
relate to the concept of informality?” 
 
First, the chapter offers an overview of the situation in Gaza providing an 
outline of the basic knowledge needed to understand the case presented; the 
institution of Hamas and the tunnel trade. This will be done by drawing on a wide 
range of empirical data from official institutions, scholars and contemporary debates. 
Secondly, we present a theoretical frame for exploring the stateness and 
structure of Hamas related to the tunnel trade. Drawing on theories from Christian 
Lund (2006) and Charles Tilly (1985), this part investigates the public authority of 
Hamas as a twilight institution, which is constituted through war making in 
formalisation processes. 
Thereafter we discuss “messy realities” following the arguments of Haim 
Malka (2012) and Hillel Frisch (2015) about Hamas’ activities as either conducting 
social welfare or mainly focussing on warfare. Carolyn Nordstrom’s (2000, 2004) 
shadow networks among non-formal actors will present the complexity within the 
concepts that offers a broader heterogeneous comprehension of Hamas and 
informality. 
Finally, we conduct a conceptual analysis of Hamas and the tunnel trade in 
normalization and formalization processes. This will expand into a broader 
examination of the illegal and illicit concepts, bringing the previous sections, on 
shadows and twilight, into play in an analysis of the fluidity of the informal.  
The delimitations of the chapter place itself in a span within time, space, and 
politics. First, our research timeframe spans from 2006, where Hamas won the 
Palestinian election, to 2015. The geographical arena, in which this chapter is located, 
is historically inflicted by conflicts and turmoil (Pelham 2012). Second, the conducts 
of Hamas affect the global political landscape, due to the wide-ranging repercussions 
associated with the Palestine-Israel conflict. We wish to contribute to a discussion on 
how the actions of Hamas can be interpreted. However, we will try to liberate our 
analysis from one hegemonic political discourse - Hamas as a terrorist organisation 
(Foreign Terrorist Organizations 2016). Third, this research takes its basis from 
within a phenomenological philosophy of science, where we focus on the empirical 
examples, and try to understand the concepts through them. 
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The case of Hamas and the tunnel trade 
 
Hamas 
When analysing Hamas, it becomes evident that they operate in a complex field, and 
under influence of various interests. The origin of Hamas, and the political context in 
which it operates, as well as international actors’ view upon Hamas, must be taken 
into account. As professor Guy Burton (Burton 2012) has pointed out, much scholarly 
literature has its primary focus on the classification of Hamas being either 
development actor or terrorist organisation. In relation to the classification of Hamas 
as a terrorist organisation, it forms a paradox. Hamas is classified as a terrorist 
organisation by both the United States (Foreign Terrorist Organizations 2016), the 
European Union (Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430) and several nation states in 
the Middle Eastern region and worldwide. This classification lies in Hamas’ armed 
battle against Israel in terms of terrorist activities, promotion and exaltation of anti-
Israel militants through rhetoric rejecting Israel’s right to existence. An overall goal 
according to the founding charter is the eradication of Israel, and the founding of an 
independent Islamic state in the Palestinian areas. The propensity to violent means is 
evident in the harsh rhetoric of the founding charter of 1988 (Hamas Covenant 1988), 
as well as in the armed conflict. A modus operandi, which does not ring well with the 
international community and in combination with a classification as a terrorist 
organization, has led to a no-contact policy from both the EU and the US (Stockmarr 
2011: 38). Though rejecting the secular democracy represented by Fatah, as a 
structure in state building, Hamas has been opportunistic regarding representative 
democracy and made use of elections when it suited them (ibid: 14). In 2006, Hamas 
won a landslide victory in the Palestinian election under the name Change and 
Reform, giving them 74 seats out of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. Seemingly encouraged by public discontent with Fatah, who held the 
political power prior to the election, Hamas entered the official political stage with 
promises of freedom, stability, development and economic improvement through a 
higher degree of international cooperation (Hamas 2006). After internal conflict 
within the Palestinian Authority (PA), primarily represented by Fatah, Hamas took 
over control of Gaza by violent means, and expelled Fatah to the West Bank. As 
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Burton (2012) has shown, the international donor community has been marginalising 
Hamas by primarily providing financial aid to the West Bank. 
The official mandate to govern ran out in 2010. Due to the strained 
relationship between Hamas and the PA, and in the absence of new elections, Hamas 
keeps governing Gaza. On a popular mandate, Hamas mimics a governmental 
institution by using governmental instruments. 
The Gazan economy is affected by the context Hamas places it in: siege by 
Israel, a regime of sanctions by international actors, resentment by aid donors and a 
general lack in job opportunities. The Israel and Egypt’s immediate response to 
Hamas’ rise to political power was the erection of a blockade of the land borders and 
supply lines, and an intensification of a sea blockade. This has left Hamas with an 
extremely limited capacity to pursue development objectives in the economic and 
social sphere (Pelham 2012a). Burton characterizes the Gaza economy as one of 
survival, based on humanitarian relief, rather than one of sustainable development.   
 
Tunnel trade 
In the Gazan city of Rafah, situated right on the border, there is a hefty underground 
activity with an estimated 1.200 tunnels at its peak in 2012 (Roy 2012). The tunnels 
have been known since the mid-eighties, smuggling only very limited amounts of 
goods and persons. Following the Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, the tunnel industry came 
under governmental authority, and there was a vast increase in the number of tunnels. 
They enforced their own security force, by establishing the Tunnel Affairs 
Commission (TAC), to regulate the tunnels flows. The tunnels span from primitive 
and dusty manholes dug by hand, to constructions on an industrial scale allowing 
trucks to pass, and some running as deep as 50 metres below ground. By 2010, the 
tunnel trade had replaced Israel as the main supplier of food, livestock, and other 
essentials such as building materials, car parts, and home appliances (Pelham 2012a). 
The tunnel trade is thereby not only vital for the Gazan civil society, in terms of 
import of building materials, but it also allows the rebuilding and maintenance of the 
infrastructure of a society affected by war activities. On the individual level, it forms 
an opportunity for a substantial income in an otherwise fragile economy, and an 
infrequent increase in livelihood. This is attractive in a besieged area where the 
unemployment rate is varying between one third and half of the labour force. 
Approximately 39 percent lives under the poverty line, and around 44 percent does 
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not have stable access to enough nutrition to meet their dietary needs (Roy 2012). The 
tunnels are a dangerous workplace; everyone in the tunnels faces the constant risk of 
being buried alive if a tunnel collapses or stake the danger of asphyxiation. As Abed, 
a Palestinian student studying in Egypt, and paying to get smuggled through a cross-
border tunnel into Gaza, puts it “I could hardly breath. I was between life and deaths. 
As you know the tunnel is 1 metre square. And this one is 1100 metres long. It is 
basically a large coffin” (The Gaza Tunnels 2014). The poor labour environment and 
dangers are not just restricted to the construction of the tunnels themselves. Also, the 
shelling and flooding by both Israel and Egypt, makes the risk even higher. Though 
the dangers are many, the underground tunnel industry is an attractive way of living. 
The tunnel trade constitutes an obvious economic incentive, creating more than one 
thousand new millionaires in Gaza in 2012 (Shaban 2013). 
Thanassis Cambanis (2010) points out how workplace accidents are 
financially insured  (Cambanis 2010: 2). To counter the poor and dangerous working 
environment, Hamas engages in rescue actions, when workers are trapped in the 
heavy gravel of a collapsed tunnel (The Gaza Tunnels 2014). 
 
 
Stateness & Structure 
 
The following section explores the stateness and structure of Hamas related to 
tunnel trade. To do so we draw on the theoretical framework by Christian Lund 
(2006), regarding twilight institutions, which revolves around how public authority is 
legitimate and not always carried by exclusive government institutions. Furthermore 
we will implicate Charles Tilly’s (1985) War Making and State Making as Organized 
Crime, to shed light on what makes a state formal and how the governing parties 
acquires legitimacy through war making and violence. 
Lund challenges the perception of institutions. Concepts such as public 
authority, legitimacy, belonging and territory are made highly relevant through the 
practices of institutions with public authority. Lunds’ terminology of ‘stateness’ 
entails internal rationality, coherence and order (Lund 2006: 685). 
Formalisation and informalisation can be viewed as competing forms of 
institutionalisation (ibid: 699). Political practices can borrow legitimacy and 
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bureaucratic figures of speech from state law and lend confidence in the idea of the 
state and thereby formalise practices. The significance lies in the specific empirical 
processes of rivalling between the institutions. Government/state and non-
government/non-state are not equal with formal and informal by definition, the reality 
is more complex. Thus, formalisation is not for the state alone, but also obtainable 
for non-governmental institutions. 
Lund understands institutions and states as complex entities that can have 
public authority and political control on different matters. Through his account, it 
becomes obvious that a wide array of interests are in play; both in rhetoric and 
actions. To fully understand Hamas, it is relevant to analyse their political, economic 
and social interests, which emanates from the tunnel trade. Focussing on the state, 
Lund draws on Philip Abrams’ distinction between the state as an idea and as a 
system (Abrams 1988). The idea of the state can be the exercising power of a society, 
and can distribute public authority to a variety of local institutions. Consequently the 
idea of the state is spread out from the state system. Thus the “state” is a conjugated 
institution, which does not solely hold the executive public authority (Lund 2006: 
686). Authoritative institutions can both exercise their authority through hegemonic 
prerogatives or they can be contested by civil society. In that way public authority or 
“stateness” can arrogate or shrink according to the public support, and is therefore a 
constant process of formation (ibid). 
The continuum between the state and society, and the public and private, is 
where such institutions operate and why they, in the terminology of Lund, are called 
twilight institutions; Institutions in a context, in which public authority is not 
exercised, in the exclusive realm of government institutions, and where institutional 
competition is extensive. Institutions can however be multi-purposed and different 
institutions with different purposes overlap, intersect and become one another in 
different situations (ibid: 692). When conducting development projects, operators 
often strategize the idea of public authority and interests. In the case of Hamas, this 
intersection is evident through the organisation’s division into a social and military 
wing (Roy 2011: 4). This division is however blurred by complex interactions and 
interests within the institution. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind how 
Hamas often is accused of conducting development work based on a hidden agenda. 
As Sara Roy, states “Good works, therefore, are never truly benevolent but merely a 
means to recruit, whether directly or indirectly, new supporters for Hamas’s violent 
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agenda wholly” (ibid: 3). This statement sums up the international society’s general 
view on the Hamas organisation. At this point it is necessary to clarify that analysing 
this discourse further falls outside the scope of this paper. While the political clash 
between Hamas and external actors is a relevant aspect of the Israel-Palestine crisis, it 
does not hold implications for the analysis of Hamas as a formal or informal 
development actor. Whether or not Hamas does in fact recruit individuals to its 
military wing through social initiatives is inherently irrelevant, as this paper’s field of 
research is concerned with Hamas in relation to the concept of informality, and not 
normative deliberations. We will therefore abstain from engaging in this discussion.  
Related to Roy’s statement, Lund (2006: 693) utilizes the notion that the different and 
sometimes conflicting interests of an institution can cause problems in different 
situations. In the same sense legitimacy is also a two-way creation. Institutions have 
to be legitimate to exercise authority, but in the actual exercise lies a claim to that 
same authority. 
Hamas operates in a highly politicised area, in terms of international and 
geopolitical interests, as well as complex domestic power relations (Pelham 2012). 
These complexities impact Hamas’ political relations to the surrounding states. Even 
though diplomacy between Israel and Gaza has remained in a deadlock since Hamas 
won the election, Egypt has engaged in formal negotiations regarding the closure of 
tunnels, in exchange for formal trade (Pelham 2012a: 12). While such negotiations aid 
in the cementation of Hamas as a formal state actor, this endeavour is partially 
undermined by great powers such as the EU and US’ refusal to recognize Hamas and 
engage in official dialogue (Stockmarr 2013: 85). 
The Israeli and Egyptian blockade has created a humanitarian crisis, which 
makes the Gazan circumstances complex (Malka 2012: 14).  Both ideological 
statements e.g. the founding charter (Hamas Covenant 1988), the election manifesto 
(Hamas 2006), as well as militant actions, can be related to the status as an 
international pariah. Hamas is placed in a span between ideology and pragmatic 
politics and cannot be characterised as a homogeneous group. To understand the 
political interests of Hamas, the election manifesto can provide valuable information. 
At least two paragraphs seem to be in conflict. 
One: The ambition about rebuilding Gaza through a strengthening of 
international relations, development of infrastructure, improve of the 
labour environment and securing of the personal freedom for both 
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genders, and a general improvement in livelihood through increased 
trade. All factors that influence the civil society through relatively 
pragmatic and low-practice means. 
Two: The armed battle against any foreign oppressor, and the militant 
resistance of occupation and the achievement of liberation. Furthermore, 
the destruction of the racist wall (ibid). 
 
 Hamas functions as an umbrella institution and through these paragraphs it 
becomes evident that the movement has a multi-purposed agenda operating via 
various actors. Both staging itself as a resistance movement, with incorruptible 
ideological goals, and as a political actor, seeking to rebuild Gaza through 
international relations. The current situation illustrates how the endeavour to fight an 
outer enemy, through militant actions and hostile rhetoric, can be counterproductive 
in terms of lost international relations. The lack of income, resulting from cancelled 
trade agreements, is at the expense of the development of Gaza and the general 
improvement of livelihood. According to Pelham, the tunnels have played a crucial 
part in fulfilling the key promise of the 2006 manifesto (Pelham 2011: 33). “Gaza 
gained control over its own supply lines, established an independent gateway to the 
Islamic world and eased itself out of Israel's customs envelope into Egypt's” (ibid: 
33). 
The second manifesto paragraph seeks to consolidate Hamas’ monopoly on 
violence, and states their goal to liberate themselves. Tilly (1985) has developed a 
theoretical foundation for how organized violence constitutes a tool to legitimize state 
authority. In general, states perform four different types of legitimizing activities: war 
making, state making, protection, and extraction (ibid: 181). Each activity helps to 
manifest the governing body’s legitimacy. According to Tilly, wars are waged to 
eliminate external threats to the state, while the state making activities are executed to 
neutralize internal rivals. The protection activities are targeted at the state’s clients; 
mainly the national population. Finally, extraction of value and manpower is a 
prerequisite for performing the other three activities (ibid: 183). 
In addition to the four state-building activities outlined, Tilly provides a 
discussion on how states’ monopoly on violence and protection came to be 
legitimized. The monopoly is only established as a result of a dominant entity 
succeeding in subduing and disarming the other actors. Along similar lines, a state 
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justifies its extraction from the population through the protection it provides and can 
be seen as multilateral. The monopoly of violence is taken by Hamas and in return, 
they protect the civil society. However, this relation is involuntary from the 
perspective of a given individual within the state. Put bluntly, you do not get to 
choose whether you want the protective services or not. As such, the extractive 
methods employed by a state, de facto resembles those of crime organisations. From 
this point of view, Hamas’ monopoly of violence is mainly legitimized through its 
position as the dominant entity within the Gazan borders (Tilly 1985: 175). A 
statement from a tunnel operator exemplifies this monopoly "We used to earn 
thousands smuggling small shipments of handguns, grenades, bullets, and 
dynamite"... "but it is no longer worth the risk to be prosecuted by Hamas."(Pelham 
2011: 30).  
 
The local arena 
Another important part in establishing the authority is found in, what Lund 
describes as, the local arena. According to Lund’s twilight institutions, the local arena 
is where public authority and power is exercised and reference the idea of the state. 
Lund uses an example of how language is bolstering the presence of the state in local 
institutions. I.e. calling a leader the “chairman”, instils the idea of the state in the field 
of action (ibid: 688). These institutions seek reliability by vindicating their non-state 
status, but are using the very formal language of the state (ibid). Public authority 
balances itself in a dialectic process with and opposing the state. Lund uses an 
example of institutions that govern local areas through the practices of governance; 
“the allocation of resources, administration of rights, appointments to office, 
authorization of certain practices” (ibid: 690) and are important in the manifestation 
of the institution. When the practices combine the choreography and symbolic 
language of state governance, the institution uses these as legitimisation (ibid). Hence, 
institutions draw discursively on state-symbols to embed formal authority. 
These practices play a pivotal role in how Hamas conducts stateness. The 
Hamas military takeover of the Gaza Strip marked a turning point for the tunnel trade 
(Hovdenak 2010: 7). Because of the Israeli blockade the siege was tightened and the 
humanitarian crisis appeared and threatened Hamas’ rule (Pelham 2012: 8). A Hamas 
leader explained how “No electricity, no water, no food came from outside. That’s 
why we had to build the tunnels” (ibid: 9) and during the following year, the tunnels 
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became the vital lungs of Gaza (ibid). This transformation of the tunnels changed the 
tunnel trade into a major commercial enterprise, which was regulated, taxed and 
bureaucratised (Pelham, 2012: 6-8, Cambanis, 2010).   
TAC implemented a licensing fee, and tax on goods passing through the 
tunnels (Pelham 2012: 11). To refer to the fee as ‘taxation’ (Lund 2012: 12) the 
language constitutes the idea of state in the field of action and is an important element 
of manifesting the authority of Hamas. Lund states how “it is methodologically 
prudent not to assume an a priori link between taxation and our ideal typical image of 
the nation state” (Lund, 2006: 695) and it is possible to argue that Hamas, attains their 
stateness through taxation as a governmental instrument. Tilly (1985) further points 
out how a well-developed taxation- and legal system, along with law enforcement, is 
formed through the need to exercise coercive force. The war making processes 
warranted by this success requires excessive extractive activities, which in turn 
neutralizes internal rivals, as their capabilities are transferred to the dominant entity. 
Following this trajectory, Tilly illustrates how war making and state making are 
interrelated, and how the prevalence of one informal actor over others, can result in 
the formalisation of a state (Tilly 1985: 182). By relating to the second manifesto 
paragraph, it is evident that Hamas dedicates a large amount of resources towards 
military maintenance. As such, Hamas maintains high levels of activity in war 
making, as a consequence of the strong external rivals, despite having access to a 
small population and a small pool of resources. Consequently, relatively little activity 
is allocated towards protection of clients. As a result, the military assumes a more 
central and autonomous role in the state’s political processes (ibid: 184). Following 
Tilly’s theoretical framework, Hamas is using war making as their main state-building 
activity.  
As specified by Pelham, the tunnels became a key driver in the ”upward 
mobility and social change empowering previously marginalized groups” in Gaza 
(Pelham 2012: 20), and states how the tunnels was both helping the Gazan people and 
kick-started Gaza’s reconstruction (Pelham 2011: 32). It is possible to argue that 
Hamas is balancing between taxation and service provision because the tunnels are an 
important lifeline for the locals. Examples of this appear in the documentary by 
Gazan filmmaker Mohamed Harb, who has documented the lives of the tunnel 
workers (The Gaza Tunnels 2014). A worker explains that “Everybody knows that the 
tunnels have alleviated the situation in Gaza” (ibid) and how everything has been 
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made available thanks to god and the hard work (ibid). Another tunnel worker 
Mahmoud Ramlawi explains that “We work because of debts, troubles, because of the 
way we live…. for food, water” (ibid). This indicates how the Gazan people find that 
the only way to survival is through the tunnels. Hamas’ work with commercialising 
the tunnel trade can be seen as a way of providing people with an economic lifeline 
(IMF 2014: 5) and thus improving the social welfare. 
Lund points out the significance of the local, in contrast to the global, and 
explains how the importance of the words “local”, “traditional”, or “historical region” 
are used in the pursuit for local power (Lund 2006: 693). According to Lund, the state 
represents an institution that explicates its territorial power. Mimicking the state in 
making space, people and resources legible, the twilight institution, Hamas, gains 
territorial legitimacy. In that way, legitimization of public authority is linked to 
territorialisation by delimitation and assertion of control over a geographic area (ibid: 
695). 
This territorialisation of the geographic area is also attained through their way 
of choreographing administrative symbols. Both Pelham and Cambanis draws out 
how TAC employs formalized control to the lucrative enterprise of the tunnel trade in 
terms of taxation, avoidance of overflow, and via a ban on unwanted goods. They 
further enforce their own security force; the Internal Security Services (ISS), to arrest 
individuals breaking the appointed penal codes expressed by Hamas (Stockmarr 2011: 
18). Police is patrolling the tunnel openings (Pelham, 2012: 11, Cambanis 2010: 
2)“…black-clad internal-security personnel at entry points to spotcheck the 
documentation of persons entering and leaving the zone” (Pelham 2012: 11). 
Regulations are put in place, and imports like weapons, alcohol and painkillers are 
blacklisted (ibid: 11). This draws the attention to the authoritarian symbolic and a way 
of legitimizing their position as the public authority in Gaza. 
 
This section has shown how Hamas can be situated within Lunds framework 
of twilight institutions. The institution employs state-like mechanisms such as trade 
regulation, taxation and law enforcement and is mimicking both the choreography and 
symbolic language of a state. Furthermore, Tilly’s theory on state-formation through 
coercive force, offers an exploration of how Hamas consolidates itself as a state 
through war making activities. From this point of view, the conflict is a premise for 
the institution’s existence. 
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‘Messy’ realities 
 
This section aims to examine the complexity of Hamas as a state-like 
institution and how the tunnel trade is incorporated in different approaches. To do this 
we will explore the biased contributions of Frisch (2015), who is vastly critical 
towards the political agendas by Hamas, and Malka (2012), who emphasize how 
Hamas partake and prioritise in the social development of Gaza. On the basis of this 
research, the framework of shadow networks, by Nordstrom, helps to shed light on a 
conceptual understanding of the arenas that Hamas operates in. To emphasize the 
complexity of the messy realities regarding our case, this section will elucidate 
different approaches to Hamas and the tunnel trade, and show how a biased 
perception of Hamas, can paint diverging pictures of reality, despite the use of 
statistics and research analysis as objective arguments. 
 
In a recent study, Frisch (2015), evaluates what he sees as the veracity of 
Hamas’ claim of being concerned with Palestinian welfare. Frisch argues that Hamas’ 
primary concerns are on resistance against Israel and war-making in general. He seeks 
to invalidate the focus on welfare and argues that Hamas fails in engaging in actual 
state-building. Frisch notes that the self-inflicted intentional blockade, and the Israeli 
siege, is a blessing for Hamas who have gained economically on the tunnel trade 
(Frisch 2015: 17, Sherwood: 2010). Frisch draws on the historical socio-cultural 
measures of the Muslim Zakat1, when explaining how Hamas has profiled them as 
being providers of Palestinian welfare. He is thus making it clear, how an important 
dilemma among states, guns versus butter (Frisch 2015: 10), regarding economic 
priority of either social welfare or warfare, clearly is pointing in the direction of the 
latter, when considering Hamas (ibid: 11).  Frisch’s main argument builds upon how 
Hamas’ expenditures, regarding warfare, are exceeding the ones of social welfare. He 
states how Israeli sanctions have damaged the Palestinian economy. The social 
welfare decreased because of the lack of cross-border labour, with a special focus on 
the former 40-50% of Palestinians that used to work in Israel. According to the Gaza 
Chamber of Commerce, 90% of the local factories had to close down  (ibid). Hereby 																																																								
1 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam, and it covers alms-giving and general economic charity 
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Frisch is positioning himself critically towards the intentions and agendas by the 
institution of Hamas. By analysing published data and thereby outlining the critical 
consequences of the population of Gaza, Frisch argues for a unilateral interpretation 
of Hamas as an institution that clearly priorities guns before butter. 
In his report, Malka (2012) is, contrarily to Frisch, arguing how Hamas has 
managed to increase the local economy while developing the healthcare sector. For 
instance, this was done by increasing the number of hospital beds between 2006 and 
2008, and appointing 2.500 new employees in the health sector in the same period 
(Malka 2012: 9). Malka is drawing on the same notions as Frisch, when considering 
Zakat. But he is emphasizing how the importance of the Zakat is covering economic 
support on different areas, such as education, healthcare, and day-care. This has a 
longer and more important state-building role to Hamas, than contemporary issues, as 
national or international conflicts. The focus on social welfare was crucial for their 
victory at the election (ibid: 2, 4). Malka is recognizing the problems measuring the 
Hamas expenditures, due to a lack of transparency on published data. He is however 
stating that one of Hamas’ oldest welfare organisations, al-Mujamma al-Islami2, pays 
5.000 stipends for kindergarten orphans, and how the Al-Salah3 Association were 
running four medical clinics, serving 15.000 people a month (ibid: 3). The Ramallah 
situated PA is however controlling cross-border flows of goods like medicine. Due to 
internal conflict between the PA and Hamas, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
is estimating that 40% of the vital medicine in Gaza was out of stock in 2011, making 
the Gazan Ministry of Health (MoH) smuggle the necessary medicine through the 
tunnels. Not as a result of the Israel-Egypt blockade, but as directly linked to 
politicised internal power competition and division between PA and Hamas (ibid: 9). 
Throughout Malka’s study he is emphasizing the vast focus on social and economic 
development. He argues that Hamas has created an independent and non-
governmental network of social services as an alternative to Israeli cross-border 
import and the PA administration in Ramallah. 
 
 																																																								
2 One of Hamas’s oldest social welfare organizations, located in Gaza City (Malka 2012: 3). 
3 The Al-Salah Society is one of the largest and best-funded Hamas charitable organizations in the 
Palestine territories ( U.S. Department of Treasury 2007, available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp531.aspx).  
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Shadow networks 
The following section is an exploration of how the biased realities constitute a 
vacuum of non-state shadow activities. Through the diverging approaches it is distinct 
how Hamas is a heterogeneous institution. When analysing the actions of Hamas, the 
study must include a wide range of interrelated perspectives, and networks of 
personnel. Based on our research field, this section aims to discuss Frisch and 
Malkas’ point of departure alongside with Nordstroms’ theoretical approach regarding 
shadow networks. The shadows are the complex cross-state political and economic 
space, which operates outside, along, and within the interests and institutions that are 
normally considered part of the formal official state order (Nordstrom 2000: 37). This 
contributes to a higher understanding of the complexity and messy realities of Hamas 
as a state-like institution. 
Nordstrom is emphasising how state-based nature of politics and economy, in 
relation to war states, has forced people to depend on, and engage in, non-formal 
markets in order to secure themselves, both financially and in relation to livelihoods 
(ibid: 35). As exemplified by economist Omar Shaban "We are now a nation of tunnel 
diggers," (Sherwood 2010) and explains how "The tunnels were seen as a tool to 
overcome the hardship. Now they have become socially, politically and morally 
acceptable" (ibid: 2010). Frisch draws on findings from the 2009 Hamas government 
budget, and how it indicates local revenues of 200 million dollars, with average 
expenditures of 500 million, as funds directly linked to the tunnel trade (Frisch 2015: 
17). According to Frisch, Hamas has a double agenda in both ‘creating’ the Israeli 
siege, and thereafter benefitting from it via the tunnel trade, at the expense of 
population (ibid: 18). Ironically the Hamas government is fighting to lift the siege, 
while at the same time benefitting from the tunnels financially, and are therefore 
striving to keep the tunnel trade moving (ibid: 17). To stress his point, Frisch is 
stating how 78,7% of the 2013 Hamas budget was spent internally on salaries to 
Hamas employees, and that only 11,2% was spent on social transfers linked to welfare 
(ibid: 25). Pelham also outlines how the development enhanced Hamas vision of 
creating relations with the Islamic world. 
 
“Armed with resources to govern from the tunnel proceeds, Hamas 
transformed itself from a nonstate actor with a social and charitable network, 
underground movement, and guerrilla force into a governing authority with a 
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well-equipped internal security force, bureaucracy, and economy” (Pelham 
2012: 22)  
 
On the contrary, Malka is drawing on data from the WHO which estimates 
that the PA is providing and administering two thirds of the medicine, with support 
from the World Bank and Red Cross, but that they are refusing to deliver it to the 
Gazan institutions in need (Malka 2012: 9). This notion is further described by 
Pelham who states how 
 
“Wholesalers surveyed in April 2010 reported that the tunnels accounted for 
68 percent of all goods available in Gaza’s markets, including 90 percent of 
all construction goods, fuel, and household appliances, 70 percent of its 
clothes and office supplies, 60 percent of its food, and 17 percent of 
medicines. One in four merchants stocked goods solely transported via the 
tunnels.” (Pelham 2012: 28). 
 
Even though the above-mentioned research is pointing in the direction of 
Hamas as an institution, working to improve the social welfare, Frisch outlines how 
the political agenda has to be seen as an official cover up used to legitimate the 
spending on warfare and Israeli resistance. A Hamas official states that, “The siege is 
a blessing in disguise” (ibid: 22). The returning of the internal conflicts, the Israeli 
restrictions, and sanctions lead to the emergence of an informal trade sector. This was 
practically carried out via smuggling of goods. 
Nordstrom uses the notion of ‘extra-states’, which refers to ‘states’ as affected by 
shadow networks and transactions (Nordstrom 2004: 36). Nordstrom argues, that 
shadow networks consist of complex interrelated ties between groups and individuals 
that move in and out of the domains, crossing the common conceptual boundaries 
(ibid: 39). Thus, the flow of medicine and other goods, changing hands between the 
actors, are forming a shadow network and cannot be contested as either illegal, 
criminal, or illicit. 
Practically and empirically Nordstrom is building her theory on fieldwork 
from Angola, which has been in and out of civil wars since the 1990s (Nordstrom 
2004: 41). She outlines how the conflicted nation of Angola, as a result of changing 
socio-cultural conditions, has been ‘degraded’ into a country split between two ‘state 
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authorities’. This has lead to a lack of infrastructure, and closedown of formal 
institutions, such as official banks. Institutional measures that commonly define 
formal state order. This notion is acknowledged by Little, Waktole & Debsu, in their 
study of cross-border livestock trade in the Horn of Africa. They are stating how the 
absence of a state institution can contribute to the growth of development (Little et al. 
2015). 
Both Malka and Frisch are recognising the internal split of governance within 
Palestine. Frisch is stressing the point that Hamas has created the internal split by 
violence to benefit from the siege. Malka is on the contrary arguing that the internal 
split has created a problematic basis for Hamas’ focus on social development, and 
how it threatens their public popularity and political success. From Malkas point of 
view, the very premise of the economic situation in Gaza is dependent on shadow 
networks such as the tunnels. 
Nordstrom is illustrating the links across conceptual arenas inherent in 
activities that are usually formal political state measures, and divides the concepts 
within these activities in order to emphasize the complexity of networks of exchange 
and association (Nordstrom 2004: 39). Construction worker and businessman Usama 
Kuhail explains how 3.000 of his employees lost their jobs as a result of the Israeli 
blockade. They found working in the tunnels as their only possibility and now works 
under the border of Egypt, smuggling goods into Gaza (Sherwood 2010). “The rest, 
he said, probably either joined the Hamas security services or are paid piecemeal by 
militant factions to launch rockets into Israel” (ibid). This indicates some distinct 
tendencies on how Gazan people unconsciously become a part of the shadow network 
without ideological incitements but purely in the need of securing their livelihoods.   
Nordstrom is exemplifying this point by explaining how a truck driver 
transferring weapons from A to B, to survive, has a different set of morals and 
agendas than the organized global arms industry, and that it should be examined 
accordingly (Nordstrom 2000: 39). Through her account, Nordstrom shows how the 
shadow economy, despite its complexity and lack of transparency has a great 
economical impact (ibid: 38). 
The diversity of goods flowing through the tunnels is painting a picture of how 
different moral issues regarding specific elements being traded. “Vaccines from Egypt 
entered Gaza following reports of disease sweeping chicken farms. Ahead of holidays, 
traders imported toys, live sheep, and fresh beef from Egypt” (Pelham, 2012: 12). 
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Nordstrom is arguing for a greater nuance and understanding of complex international 
extra-state realities. It is therefore important to understand how the flow of vaccines, 
everyday necessities, building materials and, according to Frisch, weapons, has to be 
understood as different realities, which possibly interact, and constitute extra-state 
realities. The goods can furthermore be of interest to both state and non-state actors, 
which is another argument for rethinking the blurry lines of the shadow networks 
(Nordstrom 2000: 42). 
 
This section has shown how shadow networks are created within a complex 
arena. By examining Frisch’s and Malka’s different approaches it clarifies how many 
conflicting elements are at play when considering a state-like institution like Hamas. 
Through the framework of Nordstrom, the tunnel trade becomes a network that rules 
in an arena of shadows, where the trade is considered illegal/illicit to some actors and 
legal/licit to others.   
 
 
Twilight & Shadows 
 
The following section aims to discuss the conceptual understanding of 
normalisation and formalisation processes. By exemplifying different aspects of 
Hamas initiatives and practices, this part will elaborate on the possible understandings 
of the mentioned processes. Since our case also concerns the concepts of the illicit 
and the illegal this section further contains an exploration of the concepts licit/legal 
and illicit/illegal. This is unfolded to contribute to an understanding of the complexity 
of the institution of Hamas and the underlying processes taking place in the tunnels of 
Gaza. 
As previous sections describe, Hamas employs authority mechanisms 
traditionally reserved for nation states in relation to the managing of tunnel trade. This 
mode of conduct insinuates an on-going formalisation process of the trade. However, 
due to the temporal length in which the illicit flow phenomenon has existed, it is 
possible to discuss whether the formalisation is in fact a normalisation. In this 
instance, the term normalisation refers to a process where informal actions have taken 
place for so long that they have become normal. 
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Before engaging in this discussion, some summary remarks are beneficial. 
First, Hamas imposes a 14,5% tax on goods travelling through the tunnels. According 
to Malka (2012: 7), a portion of the revenue generated through these taxes is injected 
in the health sector. Second, as Pelham (2012: 11) describes, after assuming control in 
Gaza, Hamas erected the TAC, which is tasked with regulating the tunnel trade. The 
regulation encompasses both which goods pass through the tunnels, but also to which 
working conditions the tunnel workers are entitled. Third, in addition to the 
formalisation processes directly linked to tunnel trade, Hamas’ status as a formal 
authority is substantiated by the engagement in official diplomatic talks with Egypt 
(Pelham 2012a: 12). Such negotiations presuppose a degree of recognition of Hamas 
as the authority in Gaza. 
Although these three points make a well-founded argument for the tunnel 
trade existing in a formalisation process, the arguments for this process actually being 
one of normalisation might be equally substantial. Even though Egypt engages in 
official talks, Hamas is still deemed unapproachable by large parts of the international 
community. As stated by Roy (2012), the UN’s Middle East Peace Process 
Coordinator, Robert Serry describes the contemporary commerce in Gaza as 
controlled by “smugglers and militants”. As a result of the lacking international 
recognition, it is debatable whether the work Hamas conducts is characterisable as 
formal, or whether it will always be viewed as informal. To further underline this 
point, the authority of Hamas is not merely contested internationally, but also by 
internal contentions with the PA, who controls the official inflow of medicine to 
Gaza. The inability to assume absolute control on such a vital issue as medicine 
imports, serves to undermine the authority of Hamas as the governing institution. 
These points serve as examples of normalisation. In the same manner, the 
normalisation is embedded in the minds of the individual tunnel workers. One states, 
“Because governments do not work, you feel that this way of life is the one (The Gaza 
Tunnels 2014). This statement is supporting an important point made by Nordstrom. 
The absence of a formal state order is, as initially mentioned, what forces people to 
engage in informal trade and it can, over a period of time, contribute to the 
normalisation process (Nordstrom 2004: 39). It is worth noting the dual significance 
of the quotation, regarding what are both practically and morally accepted as a norm-
giving factor. Van Schendel and Abraham (2005: 15) stresses the point that the cross-
border activities should be seen as social practices, overlapping two or more 
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regulatory spaces and violate at least one normative or legal rule. As Nordstrom 
emphasises, it is in these regulatory spaces that Hamas can create consensus of 
morality and legitimacy (Nordstrom 2000). 
Additionally, Roy notes how the formal import of cement, by February 2012, 
is only 1.600 tons compared to 31.000 tons informally imported (Roy 2012). These 
data sets the stage for a practical prescriptive possibility that the informal becomes the 
norm when the informal trade exceeds the formal. As described earlier, a 
supplementary registration of a rise in the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product, in the 
period of the Israeli/Egyptian blockade, also indicates a norm-giving factor. 
Nordstrom asks for a rethinking of the conceptualisation, which emphasises 
the blurry lines. She acknowledges how diverging and distinct ethical moral codes, 
and certain set of rules, exist outside the formal state-order (Nordstrom 2004: 39-40). 
The concepts of legality and illegality are reliant on the regulatory scale it is found 
within (Van Schendel & Abraham 2005: 17). 
 
The nexus of illegal, illicit & informal 
When examining the list of banned goods such as weapons, alcohol and 
painkillers, it is worth noting the provisos that Hamas apply to the flow of goods. 
Exact numbers on the flow of weapons are dubious, and spanning from vast amounts 
according to the Israeli domestic secret service (Pelham 2012a: 11), to none at all, 
according to tunnel workers (The Gaza Tunnels 2014). Though highly biased, both 
allegations relate well to the elusive shadow networks, where precise data regarding 
the weapons flow is hard to obtain. 
The control of the elusive weapons flow is seemingly supporting the monopoly of 
violence as well as ensuring the safety of the institution of Hamas. The monopoly of 
violence works bidirectional; Hamas has taken a monopoly of violence by force and 
upholds it by the power of a ruling entity. In return, it provides security for the civil 
society – a legitimizing measure according to Tilly (1985: 31). 
Hamas was founded as a militant movement and access to weapons seems 
therefore to be a necessity. The regulatory authority seeks to regulate the otherwise 
uncontrolled flow, to an already highly weaponised civil society (Pelham 2012: 11). 
Though the tunnels are deemed illegal on the Egyptian side of the border, they are 
legalised in Gaza, if registered and taxed. At the same time, Hamas eradicates tunnels 
that do not meet the legal framework in terms of taxation and blacklisted goods (ibid: 
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10). These circumstances can be placed in the complex spectrum of blurry realities, 
where the legality/illegality status is solely judged according to the legal framework 
of Hamas. Governing as a state-like institution, the legal framework is closely linked 
to the ideological foundation of Hamas, which have implemented a ban on alcohol. 
This corresponds well with the Islamic legal framework of Sharia, which, according 
to the Election Manifesto, is the key legal source of the governing institution of 
Hamas. Embedded in the Sharia law is a dialectic relationship between law and moral, 
which relates to the spectrum of the illicit/licit dichotomy. The fact that contraband 
liquor is still sold in Gaza, though at very high prices, can indicate multiple factors: 
the ban is not effective and tunnels are dug and operated outside the formalized 
Hamas tunnels, there is a continued demand for illegal and illicit goods, and there are 
consumers within the Gazan civil society capable of paying exorbitant prices for a 
luxury goods. 
On a global scale, both Hamas and the tunnel trade are seen as threatening and 
illegal entities (Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430). Hamas is not a recognised 
government, their activities are not acknowledged in a global context, and it is 
possible to argue that their authority of the tunnel trade therefore cannot be 
understood as formal and legal. From an international perspective, the tunnel trade is 
categorised as illegal, and many of the goods flowing through as both illicit and 
illegal. Van Schendel and Abraham points out, a general understanding of the illicit 
networks is seen as a parallel to the licit global economy (Van Schendel & Abraham 
2005: 2). Our study of the different approaches towards the tunnel trade is 
highlighting the importance of understanding messy realities. Nordstrom is 
emphasising how the lack of formal trade, paradoxically can help the development in 
a country. It is explored how the social welfare increased correspondingly to the trade 
in the tunnels. This indicates how the extra-state of Palestine is benefitting from the 
shadow networks and from the trade. 
Hamas has developed a formal moral codex preventing illicit activities, which 
is applied to the civil society and enforced by Hamas’ security forces (Stockmarr 
2011: 18). However, contraband liquor, still available in Gaza, shows that Hamas’ 
moral codex is not necessarily based on popular consensus. Due to supply and 
demand, this indicates a dichotomy between the ideal moral standards, created by 
Hamas, and the local arena. Hamas has worked for a legalisation of the tunnel trade 
by enforcing a penal code, and hereby attempts to formalise and legalise their 
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governmental power (Stockmarr 2011). The fact that Hamas has developed a penal 
code also stresses their monopoly on violence, and states their goal to liberate 
themselves. According to Comaroff and Comaroff: 
  
“Illicit corporations of this sort across the postcolonial world—loosely dubbed 
“mafias” and “gangs” but frequently much more complex, flexible structures 
than these terms suggest—often appoint shadow judicial personnel, duplicate 
legal rituals and processes, and convene courts to try offenders against the 
persons, property, and social order over which they exert sovereignty” 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2006: 34). 
 
This embraces how Hamas is mimicking state-like behaviour and is acting 
within systems of what is normally considered a part of formal state-order. In Gaza, 
Hamas becomes the twilight judge of what can be seen as legal and illegal, by 
working in the shadows of the licit and illicit. 
 
This section has shown that deeming activities and practice either licit/legal or 
illicit/illegal is multifaceted, problematic and a highly debatable matter. It is 
underlined that Hamas applies both a legal framework and moral codex to the civil 
society, which is reinforcing Hamas as the main authority in Gaza. Enforced and 
supported by a monopoly of violence, it is not necessarily a matter of popular 
consensus. 
Through an empirical discussion this section has highlighted that the status of 
Hamas’ stateness, can be understood as both a process of formalisation and 
normalisation. The lines between the two terms become evidently blurry when 
applied to this context. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has examined the concept of informality in relation to tunnel 
trade conducted by Hamas. Exemplified by empirical cases, it is concluded that 
Hamas cannot be understood solely as either a formal or informal actor, but rather that 
informality contains a conceptual elasticity, which constitutes an analytical 
framework, through which it is possible to comprehend Hamas as a multifaceted state 
and development actor. 
As an extension hereof, the chapter has demonstrated fluidity in the definition of what 
is formal/informal, licit/illicit, and legal/illegal in the case of tunnel trade in Gaza. 
The tunnel trade is both in a process of formalisation, when it is managed by 
Hamas through state-like activities, and in a process of normalisation in the minds of 
the Gazan population. 
The chapter contains a discussion of Hamas as an alternative development 
actor, and shows that one has to apply a hybrid understanding to grasp the multiplicity 
of Hamas. The conducts of Hamas challenges the concepts of legal/illegal and 
licit/illicit, where the status of each conduct is relative and should be placed in the 
current context. The case of Hamas challenges an unambiguous understanding of the 
concept of informality. 
 
Recent developments 
The conflict and the tunnel trade had not stopped by the time of our deadline. 
Published material on the area has been sparse since 2012. 
However, in a newspaper article from The Guardian (Peter Beaumont 2016), 
Israeli military is explaining how they have found the first Hamas tunnel between 
Gaza and Israel, since 2014. The finding of the tunnel has lead to a vast debate 
regarding Hamas’ military capabilities, and general intentions. Another present 
debate, circulating internationally, is whether or not Hamas is affiliated with The 
Islamic State (ISIS) (Berti 2016). The two examples show that the case is still highly 
relevant, and that it is moulding correspondingly to contemporary international 
political issues. 
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